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. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EE\'EELr R. Bux·ro01' 
Applicant/Appellant,: Case No. 15802 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree generally with Appellants' statement 
of the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Respondents agree generally with Appellants' statement 
of the disposition by the Industrial Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the award of the Industrial 
Commission dated December 12, 1977, affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree generally with Appellants' statement 
of facts except the record does not indicate an increase of dis-
ability of Applicant over that awarded by the medical panel. 
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POINT I. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT INDICATE ANY 
APPRECIABLE CHANGE IN APPLICANT'S DIS-
ABILITY FROM THE TIME OF THE MEDICAL 
PANEL REPORT. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Of the 
Industrial Commission, as written by the Administrative Law 
Judge, best summarizes the lack of evidence in the record of 
increased disability of Applicant over the rating given in 1971 ! 
by the medical panel. (R. 315, 316). 
Dr. Hebertson did testify at the 19 75 Hearing that Appli·, 
cant was permanently and totally disabled. He also wrote an 
earlier letter, for the purpose of Applicant filing the appli-
cation for a hearing, in which he stated that "It is my opinior., 
she is totally and permanetly disabled as a result of the in-
dustrial injury of February 15, 1966. But, as the record in-
dicates almost no change in Applicant's condition in 1975 over 
19 71 it is reasonable to assume that Dr. Hebertson would have 
considered Applicant permanently and totally disabled in 1971 at 
the time the medical panel made their suggested award of 40 per· 
cent disability as a result of the industrial accident in 1966. 
In the numerous examinations of Applicant by Dr. Hebertsc· 
he almost always noted that there was no change in her conditiu1 
(R. 82, 113, 153, 171, 238, 239, 253, 259, 312, 314). Andother 
than a question as to what a myelogram taken April 21, 1972 in· 
dicated there was nothing in the remaining examinations by or. ' I 
Hebertson that indicated an increased disability over the years.i 
-2-
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(R-190). A followup rnyelogram in October of 1972 showed no 
change and there was nothing said to indicate that there was 
reason to believe there was an increased disability. 
Applicant's Brief quotes Dr. Hebertson's testimony at the 
hearing (R. 294, 295) as to the doctor's reasons for the Appli-
cant's disability. "I think that the disability is not only due 
to the difficulty she has in the lurnbosacral region, but also the 
difficulty which she has in terms of pain in the dorsal region, 
and the deficits which have resulted as a result of her chordotomy 
procedure in the dorsal region. II 
All three of these conditions were considered by the Medi-
cal Panel. And the chordotomy, which was especially noted by the 
doctor, was performed some two years before the panel met. 
POINT II. 
STATUTE OF TIME HAS RUN ON 
APPELLA..~T'S APPLICATION 
Appellant is seeking permanent total disability because 
any increase in permanent partial disability is disallowed by the 
six year limitation of time. (U.S. Smelting, Refining,and Mining 
Company v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2 239). 
If an applicant is precluded from maintaining an action 
for increased perrnant partial disability it would seem futile in 
the interest of justice to provide for an action for permanent 
total disability. 
The present eight year statute of limitations is not ap-
plicable in this case as the six year statute had already run 
-3-
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when the legislature made the change from six to eight yean. 
Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, Ut. S. Crt., 1978, Docket #1521S. 
CONCLUSION 
Applicant received an award of permanent partial disabit: 
from the Industrial Commission in 1971. A medical panel reportt, 
to the Commission after examining the applicant and the Cornmis·I 
sion followed their recommendation. I 
Applicant filed many applications for different purposes I 
since the award in 19 71, but never was application made for in-1 
creased disability until 1975, nine years after the industrial 
accident. 
The record does not indicate any material change in 
Applicant's disability from the 1971 award. 
The judgment and decision of the Industrial Commission 
sould be cor.f irmed. 
Dated thisai.J_day of July, 1978. 
-4- j 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15804 
KENNETH EUGENE GOTFREY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged by information with one 
count of forcible sodomy (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 
1977)), two counts of rape (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Sripp. 
1977)), and two counts of forcible sexual abuse (Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-404 (Supp. 1977)). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury in the Seventh 
Judicial District with the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, presiding. 
The appellant was found guilty of one count of forcible sodomy 
and two counts of rape on the 21st of March, 1978. On March 
22, 1978, appellant was given one sentence of one to fifteen 
Years and two sentences of five years to life, all to be 
served concurrently in the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the 
convictions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The charges against the appellant involved three 
instances of sexual abuse of his minor step-children. The 
first occurred on September 11, 1975. Appellant's young 
step-daughter, Petrita, testified that on that day appellant 
jerked her into a bedroom in their mobile home, made her 
take off her clothes, and then had intercourse with her 
(T.60). She was twelve years old at the time (T.4). She 
stated that, "he grabbed me by the arm and jerked me and 
said if I didn't get in there, he was going to beat the 
living heck out of me." (T.6). She testified that the same I 
thing happened 20 to 50 times before (T.7). t 
Appellant admitted being in his home with two of \ 
his children on the evening of September 11, 1975, and t~at I 
his wife was not at home (T.157,158). This was substantiated 
by the testimony of appellant's wife (T.48). 
Appellant's step-son indicated on cross-examination 
that he had been in the home on occasions when appellant had 
abused his step-daughters and that he had observed sexual 
acts taking place between appellant and the girls (T. 71) · 
-2-
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Carbon County Sheriff Albert Passic testified 
that after appellant had been arrested on June 28th and 
informed of his rights in the Sheriff's Office, appellant 
stated in answer to the sheriff's questions that he had 
"undressed and played with" the little girls but denied 
having had sexual intercourse with them (T.103,104). 
Brian Matsuda was a juvenile probation officer 
who had been assigned to work with the victim's step-son 
Michael (T.88). Mr. Matsuda testified that on the evening 
of the 27th of June, the night before appellant was taken 
into custody, he visited the Gotfrey home (T.88). He 
indicated that the boy had told him of appellant's abuses 
several days earlier (T.94), and that he was concerned for 
the safety of the children (T.93). Mr. Matsuda stated 
that appellant was present that evening with his wife 
(T.89), and that appellant at that time admitted having 
intercourse with the girls but denied any abuse of the boy 
(T. 9 0) • 
Bobby Joe Fredrickson was a clinical psychologist 
of the Four Corner Mental Health Clinic in Price (T.110). 
He was not a licensed psychologist and never had been (T.111). 
Mr. Fredrickson testified that he had a conversation with 
appellant at the clinic on the evening of July 1, 1977, 
after appellant had been referred to him by his supervisor 
-3-
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(T.116,117). He noted that the conversation was not a 
"question answer session" but a "therapy c t t" ( on ac T.117). 
Mr. Fredrickson stated that at that tirne appellant 
volunteered to him that he had sexual intercourse with 
his two step-daughters (T.118). 
The next incident occurred on October 23, 1976, 
Appellant was deer hunting in the mountains with his 16 
year old step-son. The boy testified that appellant 
came to the 8-man large ten in which he was sleeping in 
a sleeping bag and held him and threatened him as he 
committed an act of sodomy (T.50-51). The step-son 
testified, "first he put his hand over my mouth. When 
I came to he was starting to unzip the bag. I began to 
squeal about and he smacked me; threatened me. • • • " 
(T.67). Several other adults were sitting around a 
campfire outside the tent, drinking, and a cousin of the 
victim was asleep in the tent(T.56,67). When the boy 
kicked his cousin and awakened him, appellant rolled 
over and pretended to be asleep (T.58). The boy also 
testified that appellant had assaulted him in a similar 
manner several times before (T.52). 
Joseph Louis Vasquez was with appellant and his 
step-son on the hunting trip and testified that the fire was 
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50 or 60 feet away from the tent and confirmed the fact 
that the adults were drinking around the campfire that 
night. He also noted that there was a truck in front of 
the tent (T .127, 128) • 
Brian Matsuda, the juvenile probation officer, 
testified that when appellant's step-son had told him of 
appellant's abuses in June of 1977, the boy had given him 
a version of the incident which varied in certain aspects 
from the boy's testimony at trial. Essentially the two 
versions conflicted in that Mr. Matsuda stated that the 
boy had told him that appellant forced the boy to put his 
mouth on appellant's sexual organ rather than that appellant 
had placed his mouth on the boy's sexual organ (T.97). 
It should be noted, however, that Mr. Matsuda did not record 
or write down any notes at the time of the conversation with 
the boy, and that he did not make any notes until some three 
days later (T.100). Additionally, both versions indicated 
sexual perversion and forced abuse of· the boy. 
The third indicent occurred on March 15, 1977. 
Another of appellant's step-daughters, 13 year old Rosie, 
testified that her step-father "raped"her on that day. 
She stated that her step-father, who was in the home with just 
her and her younger sister, took her by the hand into the 
bedroom (T.20,21). Her testimony was that "he took me in 
the bedroom and started putting his hands on me and started 
-5-
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feeling my chest, and he started getting my pants down 
and took my--put me on the bed and took my pants off. 
And he put his private in mine and had sexual intercour " 
se. 
(T.21). The girl further testified that this had happened 
many times before when her mother was home, asleep, and 
when her mother was away from the home (T..22). 
Rosie's mother testified that appellant usually 
got up after they had gone to bed and remained up much of 
the night (T.36). She stated that she never got up to 
check on the children unless they were sick (T.45), and 
that she never checked to see what her husband was doing 
(T. 4 7) • 
Dr. Lynn Taylor Dayton, a gynecologist, testified 
that he had examined Rosie and had concluded that she was 
definitely sexually active (T.83,84), and that although 
there would be a fair likelihood of pregnancy if appellant 
had had intercourse with the girl as often as she said he 
had, that likelihood would be higher for an older woman 
(T.87). 
As noted above, Brian Matsuda, Bobby Joe Fred· 
rickson, and Albert Passic all testified that appellant 
had admitted sexual abuse or intercourse with his daughters 
on separate occasions. 
-6-
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In his defense, appellant testified that none 
of these incidents took place and that he had never 
admitted abusing his children (T.164-165). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY VERDICTS. 
A 
THE CONVICTION OF FORCIBLE SODOMY 
rs SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The crimes of sodomy and forcible sodomy are 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1977): 
"(l) A person commits sodomy 
when he engages in any sexual act 
involving the genitals of one person 
and the mouth or anus of another 
person, regardless of the sex of 
either participant. 
(2) A person commits forcible 
sodomy when he commits sodomy upon 
another without the other's consent." 
The elements of the crime are thus: 
(1) any sexual act involving the genitals of one 
and the mouth or anus of another, and 
(2) the victim's lack of consent. 
Lack of consent is further defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-406 (Supp. 1977), which states: 
" • Sodomy is without consent 
of the victim • • • [when] the actor 
compels the victim to submit or 
participate by any threat that would 
prevent resistance by a person of 
ordinary resolution." 
-7-
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In the instant case, the victim, 16 year 0~ 
Michael Anthony Gene Garcia, testified that the appell 
_ ant 
came to the tent where he was sleeping on October 23, 
1976, and committed sodomy with him, against his will, by 
placing his mouth over the victim 1 s penis. The boy stated 
that appellant threatened him, put his hand over his mouth 
and held him so that he could not get up (T.51). On 
cross-examination, the witness further testified that 
appellant had "smacked" him (T. 67). When questioned 
concerning his cousin, who was sleeping in the same tent, 
the victim indicated that he had kicked his cousin, and that' 
as his cousin started to awaken, appellant rolled over and 
pretended to be asleep (T.58). Although the victim did stat 
that there were other adults around the campfire, 15 to 20 
feet away, he noted that they were all drunk at the time 
(T.56). One of those who was at the campfire that night 
confirmed the fact that all were drinking and noted that 
the fire was 50 or 60 feet from the tent and that a truck wa 
in front of the tent (T.128). 
As can be seen, the elements of the crime of 
forcible sodomy are present. The credibility and weight 
of the boy's testimony, in light of all the other evidence 
presented at the trial was a question for the jury to 
determine as the trier of fact. State v. Wilson, 565 
P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). There, the Court noted: 
-8-
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"The judging of the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight of 
the evidence is exclusively the 
prerogative of the jury." Id. at 68. 
Many courts have noted that in cases of sexual 
abuse, the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to 
support a conviction. The Arizona Supreme Court has held in 
a rape case that: 
"A conviction may be had on the 
basis of the uncorroborated testimony 
of the prosecutrix unless the story 
is physically impossible or so incredible 
that no reasonable person could believe 
it. II 
State v. Williams, 111 Ariz. 175, 526 P.2d 714, 716-717 
(1974). See also State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 
81 (1963); and May v. State, 89 Nev. 277, 510 P.2d 1368 
(1973). 
In State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975), 
this Court extended this same standard of review to a sodomy 
case. The court stated: 
"To set aside a verdict it must 
appear that the evidence was so 
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly must 
have entertained reasonable dou~ 
that defendant committed the crime." 
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 1272. 
Appellant's brief cites, at length, evidence from 
the trial in an attempt to question the credibility of the 
boy's testimony. However, this Court has indicated that a 
-9-
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possible weakness in the evidence of the state is not 
grounds for reversal. In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah ~ 
110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), cert. denied 355 u.s. 848, 
2 L.Ed.2d 57, 78 S.Ct. 74 (1957), this Court stated: 
"It is to be conceded ••• a 
weakness existed in the state's case 
from which the jury, had they been so 
minded, may well have entertained a 
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. 
But it is not sufficient merely that 
reasonable minds may have entertained 
such doubt. Before a verdict may 
properly be set aside, it must appear 
that the evidence was so inconclusive 
or unsatisfactory that reasonable 
minds acting fairly upon it must 
have entertained reasonable doubt 
that defendants committed the crime." 
(Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Middelstat, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978); 
and State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). It is the 
prerogative of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine 
the credibility of witnesses. That is what has happened 
in this case. There was ample evidence for a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B 
THE CONVICTIONS OF RAPE ARE SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1977), defines 
the crime of rape as follows: 
"A male person commits rape when he 
has sexual intercourse with a female, 
not his wife, without her consent." 
-10-
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Lack of consent is pertinently defined in the same part 
of the Code as being present whenever the victim is under 
fourteen years of age. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406(7) (Supp. 
1977). The elements which just have been established in 
the state in this case are that: 
(1) a male actor 
(2) had sexual intercourse 
(3) with a female 
( 4) not his wife 
(5) under 14 years of age. 
Petrita Garcia testified that her step-father, 
the appellant, jerked her into a bedroom and had intercourse 
with her on September 11, 1975, when she was 12 years old (T.4-6). 
She stated that this had happened 20 to 50 times before (T. 7), 
and that she complied with his demand because he threatened to 
"beat the living heck II out of her if she didn't comply (T. 6) • 
Rosie Garcia, Petrita's sister, testified that appel-
lant had intercourse with her, against her will, on March 15, 
1977. She was 12 years old at that time (T.21-21). She noted 
that the same thing had happened many times before, sometimes 
when her mother was home, asleep in bed (T.22). Rosie stated 
that she had never told her mother of the acts because 
appellant had threatened to kill her (T.32). Rosie's mother 
testified that appellant usually got up after going to bed 
(T.36), and would stay up most of the night (T.45). She stated 
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that she never checked on him or went to see what he 
was doing (T.47). 
Dr. Lynn Dayton, a specialist in the area of 
obstetrics and gynecology testified that he had examined 
Rosie on October 24, 1977, and that, in his opinion, ~e 
was definitely sexually active (T.83,84). 
Brian Matsuda, an officer of the Juvenile Court, 
testified that the appellant had admitted having sexual 
relations with the girls (T.91). Bobby Joe Fredricksoo,~ 
employee of the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic, also 
indicated that appellant had admitted having sexual relatic 
with his step-daughters (T.118). 
Thus, the elements of the crime are firmly 
established by the evidence. Appellant cites State v. 
Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865, 868 (1959), to 
indicate that a conviction of rape "should be scruti~z~ 
with great care because it is a charge easy to make and 
hard to defend against." In that case, the state's 
case rested directly upon the testimony of the prosecutrix. 
The Court, in affirming the conviction, noted: 
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• • • this offense is rarely 
committed in the presence of witnesses 
and often the conviction of the guilty 
could only be had upon the victim's 
testimony. It has often been held 
that if there is nothing inherently 
contradictory or incredible in 
her story a conviction may rest 
upon the victim's testimony alone." 
Id. at 868. 
As is noted in Wilson and Sullivan, supra, 
the weight and credibility of the evidence is for the 
trier of fact to determine. Unless there is such a 
lack of evidence that a reasonable doubt is compelled, 
the conviction must stand. In this case there is more 
than adequate evidence to indicate guilt. The verdict 
of the jury on these counts should therefore be 
upheld. 
-13-
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POINT II. 
THE T?-I l\L COU1'T PROPEI;LY l\D,i1'1"1'ED 
THE TESTIHO:~Y Of:' MR. FRED;-(ICKSOI~, 
AN UNLICENSED CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST. 
A. 
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. FREDRICKSON \-/AS 
NOT BARRED BY THE PSYCHOLOGIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE AS STATED IN 
U.C.A. § 58-25-8 (1953) AS AMENDED. 
Bobby Joe Fredrickson, as clinical psychologist at 
the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic, was called by the 
prosecution to testify as to certain statements made ~ 
him by appellant. Defense counsel objected to his testirnonj' 
on the ground that "a psychologist-patient privilege ought 
to exist in the situation" (Tr. 111). When it was establishe'. 
out of the jury's presence on voir dive examination, that 
Mr. Fredrickson was not a licensed psychologist (Tr. 114), 
but that there were other licensed psychologists at the Four 
Corners Clinic, Defense Counsel asked that the witness be 
cautioned to not reveal any information received through thw 
licensed psychologists (Tr. 115, 116). The trial court noted 
that if such information were offered, counsel could object 
at that time, but overruled the objection to the evidence 
of Mr. Fredrickson's conversation with appellant (Tr· 116) · 
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Later, in the presence of the jury, appellant 
a]ain obj~ctcd to Mr. Fredrickson's testimony and claimed 
that the psychologist-patient privilege should apply because 
Mr. Fredrickson was acting as an agent of a licensed psychologist 
(Tr. 117). The trial court refused to expand the statute 
(U.C.A. § 58-25-8, (1953), as amended) beyond its explicit 
wording and overruled the objection. 
Appellant claims that the trial court committed 
reversible error in allowing Mr. Fredrickson to testify. 
In support of that claim, he raises two arguments. The first, 
raised for the first time on appeal, is that since employees 
of government agencies are exempted from the state licensing 
requirements but may still hold themselves out as psychologists, 
they should be treated as licensed psychologists for the 
purposes of the psychologist-patient privilege found in 
U.C.A. § 58-25-8, supra. The second argument, which was 
raised at trial, is that Mr. Fredrickson was acting as an 
agent of a licensed psychologist and that communications with 
an agent of a licensed psychologist should also be privileged 
under U.C.A. § 58-25-8, supra. 
EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
It is a generally recognized rule of law that 
"where evidence is admitted over the defendant's objections 
at trial, no new grounds for objection can be claimed on appeal." 
-15-
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State v. Craig, 215 Kan. 381, 524 P. 2d 67'1 at 682 ( 19 7 JI. 
See also In Int·'::est of Oaks, 571 P. 2d 1364 at 1365 (Utah, 
1977). State v. Crace, 260 Or. App. 927, 554 P. 2d 628 at 
631 (1976), and Burns v. State, 574 P. 2d 422 (Wyo., 1978), 
Only the agency theory argued on appeal by appella:.: 
in support of an expansion of the scope of the psychologist-
patient privilege was raised at trial. The additional 
theory that government employed psychologists should be 
included was not raised at trial and should not now be consic,
1 
Nevertheless, even if the government employee theor: 
had been raised at trial, it does not compel an expansion 
of the psychologist-patient privilege. 
U.C.A. § 53-25-8, (1953), as amended, states: 
"A psychologist licensed under the 
provisions of this act cannot, without 
the consent of his client or patient, 
be examined in a civil criminal action 
as to any information acquired in the 
course of his professional services 
in behalf of the client. " 
[Emphasis added] 
As can be seen by the express language of the above 
statute, the scope of the psychologist-patient privilege is 
very narrow and is limited to licensed psychologists. In 
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 U. 2d 138, 424 P. 2d 449 (1967), 
this court declared several guidelines helpful in interpretins 
acts of the legislature: 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11
'fhs ena.ctrnent of the sta~ute 
prescribing this procedure is the 
legislature prerogative. It carries 
with it the presumptions that it is 
valid, and that the words and chrases 
were chosen advisely to expres~-the 
legislative intent. The statute 
should not be stricken down nor 
apnlied other than in accordance with 
its literal wording unless it is so 
unclear or confused as to be wholly 
beyond reason, or inoperable, or it 
contravenes some basic constitutional 
right. If it meets these tests it is 
not the court's prerogative to consider 
its wisdom, or its effectiveness, nor 
even the reasonableness or orderliness 
of the procedure set forth, but it has 
a duty to let it operate as the legislature 
has provided. (Id. at 451) [Emphasis added] 
Had the legislature intended to make communications 
with unlicensed psychologists privileged, they would have 
done so. A literal reading of the statute leaves the nature 
and scope of the privilege clear. On the other hand, the 
interpretation urged by appellant creates confusion. 
U.C.A. § 58-25-6 (1953), as amended, does state: 
"Nothing in this act . (regulating 
the practice of psychology) . shall be 
construed to limit the activities, and 
use of official title on the part of a 
person in the employ of a federal, state, 
county, or municipal agency, or other 
political subdivision, or a duly chartered 
educational institution . " (Emphasis added) 
Appellant contends that this clause exempts government 
psychologists from the state licensing requirements. He 
further contends that even though unlicensed, the prohibition 
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on te3timony of licensed psychologists i~ § S3-2 S-8, SU"r-
~, 
should be extended to them in order to not h~rnpcr gov2r~~ 
activities. 
I 
C 0 t 1 "f 1 1 I onsis ent y, i appe lant s argument were ado"t-' I 
t' !;;~I 
this policy should be uniformly applied in the interpretcti\:' 
of § 58-25-6 in total. That statute goes on to state: 
"Nothing in this act shall be 
construed to limit the activities and 
services of a student, intern, or 
resident in psychology, ... provided 
that the person is designated by such 
titles as 'psychological intern,' 
'psychological trainee,' or other 
title clearly indicating such training 
status. Nothing in this act shall 
be construed as preventing members of 
other professions from doing work of a 
psychological nature, so long as such 
persons do not represent themselves 
to the public as being a psychologist, 
except when so licensed . . " [Emphasis added] 
If appellant's theory that the privilege given to 
licensed psychologists in § 58-25-8, supra, is essential to 
the activities of anyone practicing psychology; students, 
interns, and resident psychologists as well as other pro-
fessionals seeking to do psychological activity should all 
be included within the privilege. Yet, the statute explicitel 
and expressly applies only to licensed psychologists. 
In the instant case, there were licensed psychologis 
at the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic (Tr. 113). Given 
this access to persons with whom conversation might be held 
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confiC~ntial, limiting the psychologist-patient privilege 
to communication with them v:ould not hamper the activities 
of the clinic. On the other hand, to extend the privilege 
to anyone connected with the clinic as proposed by appellant 
is to completely ignore the explicit statement of Legislative 
intent in § SS-25-8, supra. Respondent urges that such an 
interpretation contravenes not only the intent but the clear 
meaning of the psychologist-patient privilege. The trial 
court was correct in allowing the testimony of Mr. Fredrickson 
once it was determined that he was not a licensed psychologist 
(Tr. 110-111). 
l'.GEUTS OF LICENSED PSYCHOLOGISTS 
Appellant's second theory is that Mr. Fredrickson 
was acting as an °agent" of a licensed psychologist and that 
the agent's conununication should therefore be equally privileged. 
Again, appellant seeks to expand the scope of the statutory 
privilege set forth in § 58-2S-8, supra. 
Appellant argues that: 
"if a certified or licensed 
psychologist referred the patient to 
another psychologist in the Four Corners 
Mental Health Center the credentials 
of the referror ought to flow to the 
psychologist to whom the patient was 
referred." (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). 
The record does not indicate that appellant was referred to 
Mr. Fredrickson by a licensed psychologist. Instead, Mr. 
Fredrickson indicated that appellant had been referred to 
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him by his superior ~ho ~a~ not a liccns~d or certified 
psychologist (Tr. 121) . 1 
Nevertheless, evP.n if appellant had been referre~ 
to Mr. Fredrickson by someone whose communications were 
privileged under § 58-25-8, supra, his testimony would not 
have been improperly received. As noted in Gord, supra, the, 
statute should be read literally unless doing so renders it 
meaningless or unreasonable. Section 58-2 5-8, supr~, is 
clear on its face. The section expressly states the legisk 
intent to make only those communications with licensed 
psychologists privileged. Had the legislature intended to 
expand the privilege, they would have done so. Other courts , 
have limited similar statutes dealing with licensed physiciar. 
to their explicit wording. State v. Fourquette, 67 Nev. SOi, 
221 P. 2d 404 at 420 (1950), and Commonwealth v. Cohen, Hi 
Pa. Super. 199, 15 A. 2d 730 at 732(1940). 
1 In fairness to the appellant, it should be noted that 
the witness did indicate that his superior was a 
certified social worker. U .c .A. § 58-35-10, (1953), 
as amended, could be interpreted to give a social 
worker's testimony a status similar to that of a 
licensed psychologist. However, (1) this privilege 
was not claimed by appellant at trial er on appeal 
and, (2) the testimony of Mr. Fredrickson as to t~e 
qualifications of his superior or other psychologists 
at the center is hearsay. 
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Finally, an extension of this privilege to all 
1.111 0 might be acting as "agents" of a licensed psychologist 
would make the privilege over-broad and would frustrate the 
demands of justice. Physicians are not restrained by any 
privilege in felony matters (Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
27 (2)) or in any matter with respect to juvenile abuse 
(U.C.A. § 55-16-5 (1953) as amended). Neither should any 
others who are not explicitely identified be bound by such 
a privilege. The trial court, therefore, acted properly and 
within the law in refusing to restrict the testimony of Mr. 
Fredrickson on an agency theory. 
B. 
ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
UNLICENSED CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 
AT TRIAL IN THIS CASE WAS JUSTIFIED 
UNDER UTAH STATUTES REQUIRING THE 
REPORTING OF ABUSE OF ~INORS. 
The Supreme court of Washington, in State v. Fagalde, 
85 Wash. 2d 730, 539 P. 2d 86 (1975), was faced with a case 
which is very similar to the case at hand. That defendant 
had been convicted of assault upon a three year-old child. 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court had 
erred in admitting the testimonies of the director and an 
employee of the Walla Walla Mental Health Center concerning 
statements made to them by the defendant while he was seeking 
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l 
I 
I 
treatmeni. The director was not a licensed psychologist 
al though he did possess a Ph.D. in psychology. The employee I 
was a therapist, but not a doctor or a psychologist. I 
'!'he 
I 
trial court held that since neither were licensed psychologi;~ 
their testimonies were admissible over the defendant's objec':I 
The Supreme Court refused to consider whether or 
not the defendant could claim the psychologist-patient 
privilege even though these witnesses were not licensed 
psychologists. Instead, they noted, first, that confidentiai • 
I 
communications between doctor and patient are not privileged f 
where they relate to child abuse. Revised Code of Washingtor 
§ 5.60.060, 1974, states: 
"A regular physician or surgeon 
shall not, without the consent of his 
patient, be examined in a civil action 
as to any information acquired in 
attending such patient, which was 
necessary to enable him to prescribe 
or act for the patient, but this 
exception shall not apply in any 
judicial proceeding regarding a child's 
injuries, neglect or sexual abuse, 
or the cause thereof." (Emphasis added) 
As the Washington Court stated: 
"It will be seen that this 
section is not restricted to the case 
where the injured child is a patient. 
In any proceeding regarding a child's 
injuries, the exception does not apply. 
Thus, the language covers the situation 
where the parent visits a psychiatrist 
and reveals that he has subjected his 
child to abuse." (Fagalde at 90) 
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The court then noted that their child abuse reporting act, 
r<.C.'.·!. § 26.44.04(7) requires: 
"that physicians (practitioners) 
and psychologists re?ort incidents of 
child abuse which come to their attention, 
and that they include in the report 
[a]ny other information which may 
be helpful in establishing the cause 
of the child's death, injury, or 
injuries and the identity of the 
perpetrator of perpetrators." 
(Id. at 90). 
The court then stated: 
"Thus, we cannot accept the 
appellant's theory that confidential 
communications between the perpetrator 
and a psychologist, or a doctor, or 
a mental health center employee, are 
protected from disclosure and privileged 
in a judicial proceeding, according 
to the terms of the applicable statutes. 
Such protection might well be deemed 
to be in the public interest. But it 
is evident that, in its recent en-
actment the legislature has attached 
greater importance to the reporting 
of incidents of child abuse and the 
prosecution of perpetrators than to 
counseling and treatment of persons 
whose mental or emotional problems cause 
them to inflict such abuse . . . 
and . . has expressed an intent 
to protect the confidentiality of 
communications made in the physician-
patient and psychologist-patient 
relationship, except where they relate 
to child abuse; and in this area the 
interest in discovery of cases of such 
abuse and in protecting the child 
from future recurrences if found to be 
overriding. Prosecution of the offender 
is contemplated and properly incidental 
to at least the latter purpose. The 
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interest in encouraging the child 
abuser to seek treatment is subordinated 
to this aim." (Id. at 90). 
Utah's statutes in this area are very sinilar ~ 
those of Washington. All persons are required to report 
incidents of child abuse and include any information helpful 
in establishing the cause of the injuries and identity of 
the perpetrator; i U.C.A. § 55-16-2 (1953), as amended, provL[ 
"Any person having cause to 
believe that a minor has had physical 
injury as a result of unusual or 
unreasonable physical abuse or neglect 
shall report or cause reports to be 
made in accordance with the provisions 
of this act." 
U.C.A. § 55-16-3 (1953), as amended, provides: 
" Such reports shall contain 
the name and address-of the minor, if 
known by the person making the report, 
and any other information the person 
making the report believes might be 
helpful in establishing the cause of 
the injuries and identity of the perpetrator." 
The physician-patient privilege is also not applicable in 
child abuse cases in Utah as well as in Washington. U.C.A. 
§ 55-16-5 (1953), as amended, reads: 
"The physician-patient privilege 
shall not be a ground for excluding 
evidence regarding the minor's injuries 
or cause thereof in any proceeding 
resulting from a report made in good 
faith pursuant to this act." (Child Abuse 
Reporting Act) [Emphasis added] 
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~s with the Washington statute, a careful reatlinq 
of this statute clearly indicates that it is not restricted 
to instances where the child is the patient. It applies to 
any oroceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to 
title 55 chapter 16 of the Utah Code. The instant pro-
secution arose from such a report (Tr. 95). 
Thus, while psychologists are required to report 
any information regarding abuse of minors pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 55-16-1, et seq., on the other hand, Section 58-25-8 
inconsistently makes any information acquired by licensed 
clinical psychologists in the course of their professional 
services privileged. Given the fact that physician-patient 
communications, which would include psychiatrist-patient 
communications, is not privileged in child abuse cases, 
a fortiori similar communications involving psychologists 
should not be privileged and should be admissible. Therefore, 
in the instant case, the trial court's ruling admitting the 
testimony of the clinical psychologist was consistent with 
this sound public policy and should be sustained. 
POINT III. 
ALL FIVE COUNTS AGAINST APPELLANT 
WERE PROPERLY BROUGHT IN ONE 
INFORMATION. 
U.C.A. § 77-21-31, 1953 as amended, states: 
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"Two or more offenses may be 
charged in the same indictment 
or information in a separate count 
for each offense if the offenses 
charged, whether felonies or mis-
demeanors or both, are of the same 
or similar character or are based 
on the same act or transaction or 
on two or more acts or transactl.Ons 
connected together or constituting 
parts of a common sc:heme or plan." 
[Emphasis added] 
Appellant urges a narrow interpretation of this 
statute and cites several Oregon cases to indicate that 
several offenses may be charged in one indictment only when 
they arise out of the same act or transaction, meaning wh~ 
they are closely linked in time, place, and circumstances. 
The Oregon statute involved, however, is much narrower than 
its Utah counterpart. The Oregon statute provides: 
"The indictment must charge but 
one crime, and one form only, 
except that: 
(1) Where the crime may be 
committed by the use of different 
means, the indictment may allege 
the means in the alternative. 
(2) When there are several 
charges against any person or persons 
for the same act or transaction, 
instead of having several indictments, 
the whole may be joined in one in-
dictment in several counts. . " 
Oregon Revised Statutes § 132.560, 1953 
as amended. 
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Utah. unlike Oregon, not only allows one indictment to 
charge a defendant with two or more offenses when they arise 
from the same act or transaction, but also where they are 
of the "same or similar character" or where they are "connected 
together" or "constitute parts of a common scheme or plan." 
In the instant case, appellant was charged in 
one information with one count of forcible sodomy, two counts 
of rape, and two counts of forcible sexual abuse. In this 
case particularly, all five counts charged appellant with 
acts of the same or similar character which were connected 
as part of a common pattern. 
All of these offenses are found within part 4 of 
section 5 of the criminal code entitled "Sexual Abuse". 
(Specifically§§ 76-5-402, 403 and 404). Each of the acts 
charged involved abuse of the genitals of appellant's 
stepchildren. There were incestuous overtones in each count. 
lfuile it is true that the forcible sodomy count involved the 
step-son and the other counts involved step-daughters, the 
same type of sexual abuse, i.e., forcible misuse and manipulation 
of the genitals was charged in each count. The testimony at 
trial indicated repeatedly that the specific incidents listed 
in the information were part of an on-going pattern of abuse 
inflicted upon these three children. (Tr. 7, 22, 25, 52, 53). 
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Thus, the offenses charged in this case were oot 
only of a similar character, but were connected together il 
could also be considered part of a general pattern of chib 
abuse. The information, therefore, properly charged appel;• 
with all five counts. 
CONCLUSION 
Sufficient evidence establishing each of the ele~: 
of the er imes of which appellant was convicted was presente: 
at trial. The issue on appeal with respect to sufficiency 
of. the evidence is not whether a reasonable doubt may have 
existed, but whether a reasonable doubt is comp~lled. ~~ 
in the latter instance should a jury verdict be overturn~ 
upon a claim of insufficient evidence. (State v. Sullivan, 
supra.) In this case, the evidence clearly exceeds the 
requisite standard and the jury verdicts should stand. 
The trial court was correct in allowing the testim: 
of Mr. Fredrickson, the unlicensed psychologist. Psychologi: 
patient communication is explicitely privileged only when 
the psychologist is licensed by the state. Moreover, the 
privilege does not extend to situations involving child 
abuse. 
Finally, the several counts charged in the 
information were all for sexual abuse crimes. All were ofa 
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sirailar character and were conne8ted together in a general 
pattern of sexual child abuse. The trial court acted properly 
in allowing each of the counts to proceed on the same 
inforMation. 
?or these reasons, Respondent urges that the 
convictions are sound and that the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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